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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of rationality is both the origination point and the Achilles• 
heel of the study of economic theory. Two of America's most important econo-
mists, J. A. Schumpeter and Frank H. Knight, held highly developed views 
of · the rationalistic civilization and rational thought. Although considerable 
concordance is present in their Visions of rational ity, conceptual differences 
exist. 
Rational behavior is, in many respects, like beauty in that its meaning 
is defined by the extent to which there is a mapping with the values of the 
observer. Any discu ss.ion of rationality must begin with this · difficult problem 
of relativit y in values. 
Both Knight and Schumpeter were, of course, keenly aware of this problem 
of the relativitism of va lue judgments in economics and the role of such 
judgments in the sociology of knowledge. Their writings on va lues in economics 
coalesce with similar emphasis in other fields such as Einste in's theory of 
relativity, Freud's theory of the subconscious , and Godel's theory on undecid-
able propositions. 
This paper begins , therefore, by identifying th e definitions and origins 
of rationality according to Schumpeter and Knight. The paper then moves to 
en explication of the views Knight and Schumpeter held on rationali ty and 
the implications they perceived for capitalism and democracy. 
SCHUMPETER ON RATIONALITY AND CAPITALISM 
Definition and Origin 
In order to avoid confusion when using the verb "to rationali ze," 
Schumpeter explains rationalizing as supplying ourselves and others with 
reasons for an actio n which satisfy our standard of values. 1 It is not 
neces sary in his view that such rea sons take into account the true impulses 
for the action. Actions which satisfy mora l values, for an example, may 
actually be undertaken because economic benefits outweigh economic costs. 
He describes rationalit y in Marxian terms as the socio-psychological 
superstructure of capitalism. It is the mentality which characterizes capital-
ist society and particularly the bourge ois class. He argues that primitive 
human economic neces sities forced rationaiity upon the . human mind and explains; 
"it is the everyday economic task to which we as a race owe our elementary 
training in rational thought and behavior." 2 Further, he · does not hesita te 
to say that all · logic is derived from the pattern of economic decisions. A 
phrase which Schum.peter is parti cu larly fond of is: "the economic pattern 
is the matrix of logi c."3 It follows that the influence of the rational 
thought process spreads to all decisions as. the unending rh ythm of economic 
wants is favor ab ly satisfied. 
1Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democ racy (New York, 
N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1942) , p. 14 3 
2Ibid ., p. 122 
31 bid., p. 123 
2 
It is not Schumpeter's view that rationalism is inherent only in modern 
capitalist activity. In fact, he suspects that pre-capitalist man was no 
less •grabbing" than capitalist man . However, he contends that capitalism 
has been the propelling force of the rationaiization of human behavior. 
One way capitalism develops rationality is through the exaltation of 
the monetary unit. The importance of money as a unit of account in capitalist 
systems facilitates rational cost-profit calculations. Cost-profit calcula-
tions, in Schumpeter's view , crystalize and define numerically economic 
rationality--in short , they "powerfully propel the logic of enterprise ."4 
Once rationality pervades the economic sector it . influences and indeed sub-
jugates everything from man's outlook on life to his concepts of beauty and 
justice . Even his spiritual ambitions are affected by the rationalizing 
propensity : the perceived benefits of the hereafter exceed the human costs 
of the here-and-now. 
When the rationalist mental attitude is produced, the capitalist process 
provides a means for propelling the rationalization of human behavior- -
legislation. Schump e ter contends that capitalism produces both the means 
and the will to spread cap i talist rationality . This is ac c omplished through 
conspicuous capitalist success and institutional changes for the benefit of 
the masses. Policies and laws , from food stamps to affirmative action, are 
designed to promote social welJ being and , thereby, facilitate the capacity 
to act rationally. 
Schumpeter asserts that the growth of rational science and its long 




Not only the modern mechanized plant and the volume of · 
output that pours forth from it, not only modern technology 
and economic organization, but all the features and achieve-
ments of modern civilization are, directly or indirectly, 
the products ~f the capitalist process .6 
In tcrestingly, rationalism the cost-profit calculus of · capitalism--does 
not insure the survival of market systems. Instead, it produces an "antiheroic" 
civilization; a society which pragmatically accepts the world this side of 
the grave . As capitalism . exalts the rationalization process, the entrepre-
neurial spirit, which is imperati ve for the survival of the capitalist order, 
withers. Schumpeter holds that the material success of the capitalist economy 
favors the status quo. Thus, the revolutionary pattern of entrepreneurial 
activities will be replaced by logical bureaucratized management. 
In such an environment, innovation will be the responsibility "of teams 
of trained specialists who turn ogt what is required and make it work in 
predictable ways." 6 The renown~d economic progress of capitalism inspired by 
individual entrepreneurship will become depersonalized and automatized. 
Vision will be replaced by rationalized and specialized office work . 
Schumpeter summarizes the dangers of these developments as follows: "Since 
capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automatize progress , 
we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous--to break to pieces 
under the pressure of its own success." 7 
Intellectuals account for much of the criticism of the capitalist order. 
Schumpeter blames thi s situation on the emphasi s on and the accessibility of 
higher education in the later stages of capitalist civilization . University 
6Jbid., p. 
6Ibid., p. 132 
71 bid., p. 134 
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education produces e surplus of quasi-professional intellectuals who may be 
simultaneously too ill-trained for professional employment and physically 
unemployable in manual occupations. Given this set of circumstances, employment 
may require acceptance of unsatisfactory working conditions and/or wages 
below skilled manual workers. This unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed 
population develops a thoroughly discontented attitude. In effect, the intel-
lectual's indignation about th~ wrongs of capitalism represents a rational-
ization of his personal situation. 
Ultimately, discontented intellectuals express their hostility through 
political party activities , staffing government agencies and acting as advisors 
to elected off icia Is. In this way, Schumpeter asserts, as intellectuals 
impress their mentality on almost everything that gets done, public policy 
grows more and more hostile to capitalist interests. 8 The aforementioned 
propensity for social legislation may be indicative of this trend . 
The point is capitalist rationality · which once inspired progress , ulti-
mately creates a mentality of logic which undermines the essence of the system. 
In the face of spreading rationalism , capitalism cannot endure. lo working 
so well, capitalism generates expectations based upon a rational belief in 
the possibility of a superior system. 
8Warren J . Samuels points out in "A Critique of Schumpetcr,r contained 
in Capitalism and Democracy Schumpeter Revisited (Notre Dame Press , 1985), 
that Schumpeter's prediction of the demise of capitalism is much more complex 
and subtle than his scapegoating of intellectuals. Specifically ·, Samuels 
argues, his criticism of rationa ·lism and intellectuals is a stratagem for 
cr1t1c1zrng the corporate system's replacing individ.ualist entrepreneurial 
capitalism as a system of economic control. 
5 
Rationalism and Democracy 
Schumpeter's fundamental assumption regarding the relationship between 
the rational attitude and the state is the capitalist process undermines its 
own institutional framework. 
The classical definition of democracy as Schumpetc:r interprets it is "an 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes 
the common good by making the people de.cide issues through the election of 
individuals .... "9° But, he contends, the classical state cannot exist. 
First, rational arguments cannot induce agreement upon a common good for all 
people. This is due to the fact that society's view of what life should be 
is beyond mere logic. Compromises are possible in some areas and impossible 
in others. Thus, it is impossible to discern a single unique common good. 
Further, the idea of a "volonte generale" or common will of the people is 
easily dismissed, when one realizes all individual wills do not naturally 
gravitate toward a natural equilibrium even with rational discussion . In 
fact, the will of the people is the product of the political proce ss. This 
manufactured wiJI is the product of politicians or exponents of an economic 
interest who are able to fashion the will of the people. 
Schumpeter is exceedingly skeptical about human nature in politics . 
He doubts the common man's powers of observation and interpretation of facts 
as well as his ability to make rat ion al inferences. He elaborates considerable 
evidence against the assumption of rationality inherent in the classical 
definition of democracy. Specifically, he points out that economists are 
learning that the consumers portrayed in textbooks do not have wants nearly 
as definite as assumed and do not act . upon those wants in such a rational 
9Schumpeter, Cap italism, Socialism and Demo cracy. p . 250 
6 
and prompt way. He suspects ordinary man is so susceptible -to 'the influence 
of advertising that producers dictate to consumers rather than being directed 
by them . Schumpcter infe rs . from thi s state of affairs that extreme public 
gullibility exists in the realm of political acti on. 
When typical citizens enter the political field, Schumpeter suggest-s, they 
drop to a lower level of .mental performan ce. In fact, the common man argues 
and analyzes in a manner which he would readily recognize as infantile within 
the sph~re of his re a l, i .e., personal · intere sts. In summary, . the weaknes s 
of the rational process appli ed to politics, the .absence of logical control 
over the arrived at r esults , and since moral standards are relaxed in pol i tical 
affairs the ordinary cit izen is rendered "more unintelligent and irrespon sible 
than he usually is."10 Thus, Schumpeter conclude s that "the people " do not 
hold a definite and rat ional opinion about every individual question and it 
is unlikely that they can elect repre sentatives to carry out that opinion. 11 
KNIGHT ON RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
Indi vi dual Economic Rat ionality 
Knight sardon ically not es: "That ' ma n is a rational animal' is one of 
those interesting statement s which do not ha ve to be proved, since th e subject 
admits it." 12 Even though man may hold such a view of him self. Knight consider s 
the description to be too one-dim ensional as well as gene rall y fal se. To 
describe human being s as rational ignore s the fundamental romanti c elem ent 
10Ibid ., p. 262 
11David McCord Wright , "Schumpeter's Political Philosoph y," Schumpeter. 
Socia l Scientist (Freeport , New York: Libr a rie s Press, 1969): 130-13 5 
12Frank H. Knight , "Th e Planful Act: The Poss ibilities and Limit a ti ons 
of Collective Rat ionality," Free dom and Reform (Indian~p olis : Liberty Pr ess, 
1982), p. 405 
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of human behavior. Further, Knight argues that the ordinary meaning of 
rationality is efficiency: the premeditated maximization of limited resources 
to achieve ari envisioned end. In Knight's pursuit to emphasize man's romantic 
nature and to debunk . social .and economic dogma, he points out that humans 
seldom seek the "naked" and "cold" results of efficiency. Thus, man's view 
of himself as a rational creature is most likely a conviction based upon 
premises inf erred from conclusions. (Man is rational because he is the highest 
order of reasoning animal.) Thus, Knight holds: "Man is certainly not the 
rational animal that he pretends to be . . . . He is very superior to other 
animals in reasoning power, but reason is not distinctive of man and is hardly 
his predominant trait; it is often used for irration ·a1 ends .•U 
Knight considers · his major contribution to economic methodology to be his 
clarification of the nature and significance of the economic man. 14 Knight 
recognized that in order to build a rigorous and useful model of economic 
maximization man must be described as purposely and consciously utilizing 
means to attain predefined ends--the rational economic man. However, he 
also contends "there is no such man" because human beings do not know what 
they want--not to mention what is "good" for them ~-and do not act very intel-
ligently to get the things which they have decided to acquire. Besides, to 
act completely rational would require totally impersonal and non-romantic 
behavior which is not only irrational but impossible. Hence, he believed a 
science of conduct is an impossibility because data of conduct is provisional , 
13Frank H. Knight , "The Free Society: Historical Background," Int ellig ence 
and Democratic Action (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. I 960) , p. 52 
HWilliam Breill , "Frank H. Knight - Philosopher of the Counter-Revolution 
in Economics," The Academic Scrib le rs (New York , N.Y .: Holt , Rinehart and 
Winston, 1971 ), p. 200 
8 
shifting, and specific -to individual situations to such a high degree that 
generalization is relatively fruitlcss. 16 Consequently, Knight has always 
cautioned against the overzealous application of economic theory to non-economic 
problems and argued that economic theory is not an explanatory science of 
reality. Perhaps, ironically, Knight's link to neoclassical economics is 
that modern positivist economists · have used Knight's restated economic man 
to justify their position that assumptions of economic theories are secondary 
to predictive power. 
In order to understand the essence of Knight's view of individual ration-
ality and its place in economics, it is necessary to know the definition _and 
description of rationality which was being promulgated by economic writers 
in Knight's day. For, as he himself acknowledged, Frank Knight was essentially 
a critic and much of his work is a search for logical contradictions in economic 
theory. He saw his main task, and the task of general education, to be to 
•unteach" the acceptance of dogma and to develop the will to be intelligent, 
i .e., objective and critical. Further, it appears that Frank Knight was not 
pleased with the course modern economics was taking. He particularly disap-
proved of the "economic" explanation of human behavior as well as attempts 
at predicting real world results from idealized theoretical economic models. 
Thus, he found MarshaJJjan and other definitions of economics, viz., "the 
ordinary business of life" or "the sc ience of rational activity," useless 
and misleading. 16 To Knight , such definitions suggested that economics is the 
science of everything that generally concerns mankind . On the one hand, 
15Frank H. Knight , "Ethics and the Economic Interpretation: Ethics of 
Competition (Freeport, New York: Libraries Press, 1969), p. 35 
16Frank H. Knight, The Economic Organization (New York, N.Y .: Harper & 
Row Publishers, I 933, 195 I), p. 4 
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economizing behavior docs not encompass all human activity, and on the other, 
lif c must be much more than rational conduct or the intelligent use of resources 
to achieve pre-determined results. 
In the opening pages of The Economic Organization, he points out that 
common definitions of Economics are too broad, and the rational economic 
conception of life is too narrow. He draws out the implications of the state· 
ment by noting: "Living intelligently includes more than the intelligent 
use of means in realizing ends; it ·is fully as important to select the ends 
intelligently, ." and "Living is an art; and art is more than . a matter 
of scientific technique, and the richness and value of life are largely bound 
up in the 'more.'" 17 In this he concurs with John M Clark that an irrational 
passion for dispassionate rationality would take all of the joy out of life. 
Although Knight was not a utopian, he expresses hope for a society where the 
everyday st_ruggle to maximize the production of material necessities will 
give way to a culture devoted to problems of truth, improved human relations, 
and beauty. 
Collective Rationality and Democracy 
In his essay, "Can the Mind Solve the Problems Raised by Its Liberation :· 
Knight recognizes the tendencies relea_sed by liberal culture toward "acute 
discontent, criticism, and fault-finding ."18 He infers, much like Schumpeter , 
that favor-able capitalist conditions have caused this critical attitude to 
develop with astonishing speed as a culture trait. He concedes that the 
propensity to dis se nt against economic and pol i tica I conditions has existed 
17Ibid., pp. 3-4 
18Frank H. Knight, "Can the Mind Solve the Problems Raised by Its Libera-
tion," Intelligence and Democratic Action (see No . 14), p. 144 
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all along but speculates it was held in check by the harsh discipline of 
precapitalist-preliberal culture. 
Knight is probably as skeptical as Schumpcter about the possibility of 
society making rational political selections . in a democracy. In dealing 
with the existence of collective rationality in a democracy, Knight, as always, 
is attempting to show something of the complexity and difficulty of accepting 
traditional truths. He recognizes that collective rationality in a democracy 
involves rationally delegating power. This implies: the will and intellect 
exist to choose a representative; . the mechanics to rationally select an agent 
are operational; once selected, the agent is given instructions concerning 
the process to use in order to achieve a rational end; and a means must ~xist 
for holding the agent responsible for carrying out the instructions. Using 
an analogy whereby a patient must choose a physician, Knight expresses his 
reservations . concerning the public's ability to rationally choose political 
leadership. 
·First, it is impossible for a leader to be selected intelli-
gently, in .the scientific sense . In order to select "his doctor 
scientifically, the patient would have to know all the medical 
science known by all the candidates under consideration, and 
in addition know how much of this knowledge was possessed 
by each separate candidate. Secondly, the relation between 
leader and follower must be a moral relation, one of confidence 
and trust on the part of the client and of moral integrity 
and of candour tempered by judgment on the · part of the counsel-
lor. Thirdly, where the leader is chosen by the · follower 
or client on the basis of active competition for the position, 
the follower becomes the real leader; for the methods of com-
petition by those seeking appointment will run largely to 
competition in promising to do what the clien .t wants done, 
and by debating technical details will make him the judge of 
these, and to promising results of whose probability of realiza• 
tion the counsel-seek.er must judge. And all this is the more 
certainly true where the follower is a group, amenable to 
manipulation through crowd psychology. Fourthly, active com-
petition for pos1t1ons of leadership, especially leadership 
of groups of considerable size, means the progressive degradation 
of the entire system through the use of salesmanship or 
I I 
"infl uence,"--fla ttery, cajolery, outright deception, and 
sheer pres sure of suggestion and assertion. This means appeal 
from intelligence to the most irrational emotions . The methods 
of competition adopted by aspirants to positions of leader-
ship must be those which "work"; candidates in any way restrained 
by "principles• will simply be eliminated. And it goes without 
saying that competence to persuade is only accidenta'lly and 
improbably associated with competence to counsel and to lead. 10 
Clearly, Knight thought that due to human nature and the complexity of modern 
decisions there are very narrow limits to the achievement of collective 
rationality. He argued that in the political field the possibility of knowledge 
adequate for rational ·group action is extremely limited. 
Even though Knight is skeptical about the possibility of collective 
rationality, · he held that intelligent social action is · distinctly possible . 
In fact; Knight contends in a truly democratic system men must use freedom 
intelligently and intelligent is preferable to rational. 
The first step in Knight's system for intelligent social . action is to 
compare the alternative~, beginning with understanding what they are. This 
procedure must l_ogically be conducted prior to action . After knowledge of 
alternatives and conditions is assimilated, it is possible 10 proceed to the 
second stage of the analytical process of social reform : the formulation of 
an ideal or a rationally desired end. To Knight, it is imperative that 
reformers have a detailed view of the consequences of change before action 
is undertaken. The final task in Knight's model for undertaking intellig ent 
social action is to decide the appropriate means for social change . Knight 
is quick to point out that inaction and the "natural" cour se of event s ma y 
be the best alternative . His basic axiom is that it is better not to act 
19Knight, ~Economic Theory and Nationalism," Ethics of Compe t it ion. 
pp. 304-305 
12 
unless it can be done intelligently because the chances are good that harmful 
results will ·rot1ow from acting randomly--or unintelligently. 
In summary, Knight concurred with Lord Bryce that democracy should ideally 
be "government by discussion." Thus , in a Jeffersonian sense, Knight held 
that the cost of freedom is intellectual initiative and the will to use 
intelligence intelligently. 
Conclusion 
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Schumpeter contends that the "rnatriJt of logicff in economic life is 
rationality; the socio-p syc hological superstructure of capitalism is f oundcd 
upon rational • cost-profit calculations; and, rationalism inspires an almost 
universal hostility to capitalism which will promote the demise of the capi-
talist system. 
The view of · society's rationality held by Schumpeter is surely elitist 
and cynical. Most •likely it is a product of his ari •stocr atic, Austrian 
rearing. 20 He seems to have perceived only two types of man , the ordinary 
variety and the uncommonly gifted person. The former may behave rationally 
in daily matters at home and in business, but as voters, often pro ve themselves 
bad and indeed corrupt judges of their own interests. He contended: " ... the 
great political questions take their place in the psychic of the typical 
citizen with those leisure-hour interests that have not attained the rank of 
hobbies, and with the subjects of irresponsible conversation.' '21 Also, 
Schumpeter thought the rational acceptance of efficiency in· an automated, 
bureaucratjzed production process would undermine the entreprene'!rial spirit, 
which is the driving . force of capi tal ism, and ha sten the advance of socialism. 
Knight's view is more sanguine . . He argues that life is more than economics 
and rational conduct, and that living intel l igently requires more than using 
means to achieve ends. Further, in Knight's view most economic activity is 
rivalrous and contentious, and, thus, irrat iona l. He thoroughl y pr oves the 
irrationalit y of perfect rationality · with his description of the "economic 
20L. A. O'Donnell, "Rationalism, Capitalism and the Entrepreneur: T he 
Views of Veblen and Schumpeter," History of Politic a l Economy, Vol. 5, No. I 
(Spring 1973 ): 202 
21Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,.p. 261 
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man." He also contends that liberal culturc•s "liberation of the mind" releases 
a tendency to be critical of capitalist relations . Ultimately, Knight replaces 
economic calculation with critical intelligence as the imperative mental 
process for democratic economic and political action. 
Knight worked tow;ird and hoped for a society based upon common sense 
rationality . Such a hope probably sprang from his mid-American roots .n He 
recognized that the economic man exists, to some degree, in every person , 
but the romantic , the social animal, the prejudiced ignoramus also exists 
alongside the rational ma~imizer of economic interest. He rejected intel-
lectual elitism and took it upon himself to expose the fallacies, nonsen se 
and absurdities in what is passed off as sophisticated-scientific discourse. 
Ultimately, be urged society to nurture the will to develop a more critical 
attitude. 
Institutional Economics is positive economics. In stitutionalis-ts should 
attempt to confirm or den y the economic theories and predictions for society 
by writers like Schumpeter and Knight by investigating evolving economic 
reality. Herein, it can be said that capitalist rationali sm has produc ed 
the corporate system as well as critical intellectuals. One mjght also argue 
that state-of-the-art empirical techniques are influencing the economic . ques-
tions asked today ahd are being overzealously extended to political and economic 
questions (or as Knight once noted : using . empirical trivia to prove water 
runs downhill) . And, with the observance of recent elections of Lyndon LaR ouchc 
followers , the exi ste nce of collective ration a lity certainly can be questioned. 
22In a recent paper Donald Dewey pre sents , with a refreshing combin ation 
of the geneological and philosophical perspectives , a deta iled and entertaining 
a·ccount of Knight' s early years. Donald Dewey , "Frank Knight Before Cornell: 
Some Light on the Dark Years," paper present ed at the 55th annual meeting of 
the Southern Economic Assoc iation, Da llas, November 25: 1985. 
)5 
Finally, the fact that . socialism docs not appear likely to replace corporate 
capitalism in the U.nited States anytime in the near . future does not disprove 
the effects of rat ionality averred by Schumpetcr and Knight . Rather, it 
reflects the impact a risin ·g standard of living has on social questions. 
Thus, in the view of the authors Schumpeter and ~night's views of 
rationality in capitalism and democracy are penetrating and enlightening, 
and have borne up remarkably well. 
16 
